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Abstract
We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem on a closed interval. There
are n agents spread on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the
facility to be as far from them as possible, and type 2 agents, who wish for the facility to be
as close to them as possible. Our goal is to maximize a form of aggregated social benefit. We
consider two social benefit functions: the sum of agents’ utilities and the minimal agent utility,
respectively denoted as the maxisum and the egalitarian objectives. The strategic aspect of
the problem is that the agents’ types and locations are not known to us, but rather reported
to us by the agents– an agent might misreport his type and\or location in an attempt to move
the facility towards or away from his true location. We therefore require the facility-locating
mechanism to be strategyproof, namely that reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy for
each agent. As simply maximizing the social benefit is generally not strategyproof, our goal
is to design strategyproof mechanisms with good approximation ratios.
In our paper, we begin by providing a best-possible 3- approximate deterministic strate-
gyproof mechanism, as well as a 23
13
- approximate randomized strategyproof mechanism, both
for the maxisum objective. We then provide a characterization of all deterministic strate-
gyproof mechanisms, for the case where only type 1 agents are present (also known as the
obnoxious facility problem). We use that characterization to prove a (best-possible) lower
bound of 3 for the maxisum objective, and to show that the approximation ratio is unbounded
for the egalitarian objective. When allowing for randomization, we prove lower bounds of 2√
3
and 3
2
for the maxisum and egalitarian objectives respectively. All lower bounds hold even
when only type 1 agents are present. Finally, while restricting ourselves to agents of type 1
only, we consider a generalized model that allows an agent to control more than one loca-
tion. In this generalized model, we provide 3- and 3
2
- approximate strategyproof mechanisms
for the maxisum objective in the deterministic and randomized settings, respectively (for the
randomized setting, we actually provide a family of such mechanisms).
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†IEOR Department, Columbia University, New York, NY; jay@ieor.columbia.edu. Research supported by
NSF grant CMMI-0916453 and CMMI-1201045.
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1 Introduction
When a public facility is to be constructed, the general population has varying preferences regard-
ing its location. For example, if the facility is a transit station, members of the population who
rely on public transportation are likely to want it located near them for convenience, while those
who own a car will want the station located far from them in order to avoid the added commotion
and traffic. These preferences must be taken into account by local government when it decides on
the construction site. However, there are many situations in which the government does not know
these preferences reliably and\or cannot deduce them easily. Certainly, the government does not
know whether a person prefers the facility near or far. In addition, the government might not
know each person’s reference point, that is where the person want the facility near to or far from.
This can be due to poor data (the government does not fully know the location of houses and
who lives where), but can also be because different people have different kinds of reference points
(for example, a person who spends most of his time at work might use his workplace as his main
reference point rather than his home).
More specifically, consider the problem of locating a single facility on a street, that is a closed
interval. There are n agents, located in the interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who
wish for the facility to be as far away from them as possible, and type 2 agents, who wish for
the facility to be as close to them as possible. In particular, the utility of a type 1 agent equals
his distance from the facility, while the utility of a type 2 agent equals the length of the interval
minus his distance from the facility.1 A social planner wishes to locate the facility in a way
that maximizes some aggregated measure of the agents’ utilities. However, we are interested in a
variant of the problem (first introduced in [12]), in which the types and locations of the agents
are not known to the planner, but rather are reported to the planner by the agents themselves. In
that case, an agent might misreport its type and\or location if doing so will cause the planner to
place the facility at a site more desirable to that agent. Due to this strategic aspect, the planner
cannot simply locate the facility at the optimal location with respect to the reports. Instead, we
require the mechanism used by the planner to be strategyproof: truthful reporting is a dominant
strategy for each agent. Subject to this requirement, the planner’s goal is to optimize the social
benefit, in terms of worst case approximation ratio. We consider two social benefit functions: the
maxisum function, which is simply the sum of the agents’ utilities, and the egalitarian function,
which is the minimum agent utility.
The strategic facility location problem and its variations have received a lot of attention in
the recent literature. The case of the unbounded interval with type 2 agents alone was studied
in [12], [7] and [6]; a notable characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms in this
1See section 2 for a short explanation regarding the utility of type 2 agents.
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setting is given in [11]. The case of the bounded interval with agents of type 1 alone, called the
obnoxious facility location problem, was introduced in [5] and further explored in [9]. There is
much related research, considering different graph topologies, different number of facilities, and
more: see, for example, [4], [2], and [1]. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to
consider the generalized, hybrid model which contains both types of agents.
Our main findings are summarized below:
• We design a 3- approximate deterministic strategyproof mechanism, and a 2313 - approximate
randomized strategyproof mechanism for the maxisum objective.
• We characterize deterministic strategyproof mechanisms when only type 1 agents are present.
• We prove a lower bound of 3 on the approximation ratio of deterministic strategyproof
mechanisms for the maxisum objective, thus proving the optimality of the mechanism we
provide for this setting. We also show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can
provide a bounded approximation ratio for the egalitarian objective. These bounds hold
even when all agents are of type 1.
• We prove lower bounds of 2√
3
and 32 on the approximation ratio of randomized strategyproof
mechanisms for the maxisum and egalitarian objectives, respectively. These bounds hold
even when all agents are of type 1.
• We consider a generalized model that allows an agent to control more than one location.
In this model, we provide a 3- and 32 - approximate strategyproof mechanisms for the max-
isum objective in the deterministic and randomized settings respectively, assuming only
type 1 agents are present (in the randomized setting, we actually provide a family of such
mechanisms).
2 Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents, and let I be the closed interval. We assume, without
loss of generality, that I = [0, 2]. Let the set of possible types be T (generally, we will have
T = {1, 2}, but for some results we would like T = {1}). Each agent i ∈ N reports a type θi ∈ T
and a location xi ∈ I. The vector θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) is a type profile; for any α ∈ T , we also
use the notation (α, θ−i) = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θi−1, α, θi+1, . . . , θn), where θ−i = (θ1, θ2, θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn)
is a partial type profile of all agents but i. Similarly, the vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a location
profile (the notation (α,x−i) is defined as (x1, . . . , xi−1, α, xi+1, xn)). A deterministic mechanism
is a collection of functions f = {fn|n ∈ N} such that each fn : T n × In → I maps each type and
location profiles θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) and x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) to the location of the facility. We use
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f(θ,x) instead of fn(θ,x) when n is clear from the context. Similarly, a randomized mechanism
is a collection of functions f that maps each pair of type and location profiles to a probability
distribution over I: if f(θ,x) is the distribution π, then the facility is located by drawing a single
sample from π.
We study deterministic and randomized mechanisms for the problem of locating a single
facility when the type and location of an agent are private information to that agent and cannot
be observed or otherwise verified. It is therefore critical that the mechanism be strategyproof—it
should be optimal for each agent i to report his true type θi and location xi. To make this precise,
we assume that if the facility is located at y, an agent’s utility, equivalently benefit, is either
B(θi, xi, y) = |xi − y| if θi = 1, or B(θi, xi, y) = 2 − |xi − y|, if θi = 2 (the number 2 is chosen
merely because it is the length of I. Of course, what we really want is for the utility of a type
2 agent to be −|xi − y|. But in order to meaningfully discuss approximation ratios, we require
nonnegative utilities. With this choice, the utility of each agent is between 0 and 2 regardless of
his type, and the utility changes linearly with the distance the same way it would without adding
the constant. This seems to be the natural choice). If the location of the facility is randomly
distributed with distribution π, then the benefit of agent i is simply EY∼π[B(θi, xi, Y )], where Y
is a random variable with distribution π. The formal definition of strategyproofness is now:
Definition 1. A deterministic (randomized) mechanism f is strategyproof if for each i ∈ N , each
θi, θ
′
i ∈ T , xi, x′i ∈ I and for each θ−i ∈ T n−1, x−i ∈ In−1 we have B(θi, xi, f((θi, θ−i), (xi,x−i))) ≥
B(θi, xi, f((θ
′
i, θ−i), (x
′
i,x−i))) (EY∼f((θi,θ−i),(xi,x−i))[B(θi, xi, Y )] ≥ EY∼f((θ′i,θ−i),(x′i,x−i))[B(θi, xi, Y )]).
In this paper we assume that locating a facility at y when the type profile is θ and the location
profile is x gives the social benefit sb(θ,x, y), where we consider two possible options for sb: max-
isum, defined by sb(θ,x, y) =
∑n
i=1B(θi, xi, y), and egalitarian, sb(θ,x, y) = mini∈N B(θi, xi, y).
When the facility is located according to a probability distribution π, maxisum is defined as
sb(θ,x, π) = EY∼π[
∑n
i=1B(θi, xi, Y )], and egalitarian as sb(θ,x, π) = EY∼π[mini∈N B(θi, xi, Y )].
The goal is to find a strategyproof mechanism that does well with respect to maximizing (ei-
ther definition of) the social benefit. A natural mechanism is the “optimal” mechanism: each
pair of type profile θ and location profile x is mapped to OPT (θ,x), defined as2 OPT (θ,x) ∈
argmaxy∈I sb(θ,x, y). However, the optimal mechanism is not generally strategyproof. For ex-
ample, consider the case with two type 1 agents, the first located at 23 and the second located at
3
2 . In this case, the optimal mechanism for the maxisum objective would locate the facility at 0.
However, when the first agent is located at 13 and the second agent is located at
3
2 , the optimal
mechanism locates the facility at 2. Since when the first agent’s true location is 23 he prefers the
2 If the social benefit is maximized by multiple locations y, an exogenous tie-breaking rule is used to select one
of the optimal locations.
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facility to be located at 2 over 0, he has an incentive to misreport his location to be 13 instead,
violating strategyproofness.
Given that strategyproofness and optimality cannot be achieved simultaneously, it is necessary
to find a tradeoff. In this paper we shall restrict ourselves to strategyproof mechanisms that
approximate the optimal social benefit as best as possible: an α- approximation (α ∈ [1,∞))
algorithm guarantees at least a 1
α
fraction of the optimal social benefit for every instance of the
problem. Formally, the approximation ratio of an algorithm A is supQ{OPT (Q)/A(Q)}, where
the supremum is taken over all possible instances Q of the problem; and A(Q) and OPT (Q) are,
respectively, the benefits obtained by algorithm A and the optimal algorithm on the instance Q.
Our goal is to design a strategyproof mechanism whose approximation ratio is as close to 1 as
possible.
3 Deterministic and Randomized Mechanisms for the Hybrid
Model
In this section, we provide a best-possible 3- approximate deterministic strategyproof mechanism
for the maxisum objective, as well as a 2313 - approximate randomized strategyproof mechanism for
the same objective.
Theorem 1. Let R = {i : θi = 1, xi ≤ 1} ∪ {i : θi = 2, xi ≥ 1} and L = {i : θi = 1, xi >
1} ∪ {i : θi = 2, xi < 1}. Let f be the mechanism that locates the facility at 2 if |R| ≥ |L| and at
0 otherwise. Then f is a 3- approximate strategyproof mechanism for the maxisum objective.
Proof. Strategyproofness is easy. Note that R is the set of agents who weakly prefer the facility
located at 2 over 0, and L is the set of remaining agents. Since there are only two possible fa-
cility locations in this mechanism, the only case which requires analysis is when agent i prefers
the facility to be located at the endpoint not chosen by the mechanism. Assume without loss of
generality that the facility is located at 2, yet agent i prefers the facility to be located at 0 (that
is, i ∈ L). Then, by misreporting, he cannot decrease |R| and cannot increase |L|, and therefore
regardless of his report, the facility will be located at 2.
For the approximation ratio, let θ and x be a type and location profile respectively. We would
like to show that sb(θ,x,a)
sb(θ,x,f(θ,x)) ≤ 3 for every possible facility location a ∈ I 3. We will prove this for
3Note that the statement “ sb(θ,x,a)
sb(θ,x,f(θ,x))
≤ 3 for every possible facility location a ∈ I” is equivalent to
sb(θ,x,OPT (θ,x))
sb(θ,x,f(θ,x))
≤ 3, as OPT (θ,x) maximizes the numerator by definition and hence the ratio. However, we
choose to analyze an arbitrary fixed a rather than OPT (θ,x) to avoid having to consider the impact agents’ reports
have on the optimal location of the facility.
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the case of f(θ,x) = 2; the other case is similar. Let Rj be the set of agents of type j in R, and
similarly let Lj be the set of agents of type j in L. Then q1 = sb(θ,x, a) =
∑
i∈R1∪L1 |xi − a| +∑
i∈R2∪L2(2− |xi − a|), and q2 = sb(θ,x, f(θ,x)) =
∑
i∈R1∪L1(2− xi) +
∑
i∈R2∪L2 xi. If the ratio
q1
q2
< 1, there is nothing to prove. Assume q1
q2
≥ 1. Note that for i ∈ R1 ∪ L1, increasing xi by α
decreases the denominator by α, and decreases the numerator by at most α (might even increase
the numerator in some cases). Since the ratio is at least 1, such a change increases the ratio.
Similarly, for i ∈ R2 ∪L2, decreasing xi has the same effect. Given that xi ≤ 1 for i ∈ R1, xi ≥ 1
for i ∈ R2, and xi ∈ [0, 2] for all i, this implies q1q2 ≤
∑
i∈R1
|a−1|+∑i∈L1∪L2(2−a)+
∑
i∈R2
(2−|a−1|)
|R| . We
break our proof into two cases:
1. a ∈ [0, 1]: ∑i∈R1 |a−1|+
∑
i∈L1∪L2(2−a)+
∑
i∈R2(2−|a−1|) = |R1|+2|L1|+2|L2|+ |R2|+
a(−|R1| − |L1| − |L2| + |R2|) ≤ max {|R|+ 2|L|, |L| + 2|R2|}, where the inequality follows
from the fact that the maximum is obtained when a ∈ {0, 1} (If −|R1|−|L1|−|L2|+|R2| ≤ 0,
then it is obtained at a = 0, and otherwise at a = 1). Note that |L| ≤ |R| since f(x) = 2,
and that |R2| ≤ |R| by definition. Thus, max {|R|+ 2|L|, |L| + 2|R2|} ≤ 3|R|. Therefore,
q1
q2
≤ 3|R||R| = 3
2. a ∈ [1, 2]: ∑i∈R1 |a−1|+
∑
i∈L1∪L2(2−a)+
∑
i∈R2(2−|a−1|) = −|R1|+2|L1|+2|L2|+3|R2|+
a(|R1| − |L1| − |L2| − |R2|) ≤ max {|L|+ 2|R2|, |R|}. Again, both terms we’re maximizing
over are no more than 3|R|, and so again q1
q2
≤ 3.
Later, we prove a lower bound of 3 on the approximation ratio possible under strategyproof-
ness. Thus, the approximation ratio achieved by this mechanism is best-possible. Moreover, in
the obnoxious facility model (when no type 2 agents exist), the above mechanism reduces to the
deterministic mechanism proposed in [5], who proved that it is a 3- approximation for that special
case.
We now use randomization in an attempt to lower the approximation ratio. Getting a 2- ap-
proximation is easy: choosing each endpoint with probability 12 is a 2- approximate strategyproof
mechanism 4. However, we can do better:
Theorem 2. Let p1 =
12
23 , p2 =
8
23 , and p3 =
3
23 . Consider the following randomized mechanism
f . If |R| ≥ |L|, then P (f(θ,x) = 2) = p1 and P (f(θ,x) = 0) = p2; if |R| < |L|, then P (f(θ,x) =
2) = p2 and P (f(θ,x) = 0) = p1; and either way, P (f(θ,x) = 1) = p3. The mechanism f is a
strategyproof, 2313- approximate mechanism.
4In [5], the authors note that this mechanism is 2- approximate for the obnoxious facility model; this still holds
true for the hybrid model.
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Proof. Strategyproofness is proved similarly to Theorem 3.1. For the approximation ratio, we
would like to show that sb(θ,x,a)
sb(θ,x,f(θ,x)) ≤ 2313 for every possible facility location a ∈ I. We will
prove this for the case of |R| ≥ |L|; the other case is similar. Define Rj and Lj as in the proof
of Theorem 3.1. We begin by noting that the approximation ratio is bounded from above by
46
19 (it is easy to see that every agent is guaranteed a benefit of at least
19
23 in our mechanism,
while the maximal benefit of any agent is 2). Note that the mechanism’s expected benefit is
q2 = − 723
∑
i∈R1 xi− 123
∑
i∈L1 xi+
1
23
∑
i∈R2 xi+
7
23
∑
i∈L2 xi+
27
23 |R1|+ 2123 |L1|+ 2523 |R2|+ 1923 |L2|.
We break into cases:
1. a ∈ [0, 1]: in this case, the benefit from locating the facility at a is q1 =
∑
i∈R1 |a − xi| +∑
i∈L1(xi − a) +
∑
i∈R2(2 + a− xi) +
∑
i∈L2(2− |a− xi|). Note that the ratio q1q2 increases
with xi for i ∈ L1, and decreases with xi for i ∈ R2; thus, to maximize it, we set xi = 2 for
i ∈ L1 and xi = 1 for i ∈ R2. For i ∈ L2, xi = a maximizes the ratio (note that changing
xi by α decreases the numerator by α and either increases or decreases the denominator
by 723α, a change that decreases the ratio since it is known to be no more than
46
19 <
23
7 ).
Depending on a, to maximize the ratio we need to set xi = 0 for all i ∈ R1 or xi = 1 for all
i ∈ R1. We check both cases:
(a) xi = 0 for all i ∈ R1. Then the ratio becomes a(|R1|−|L1|+|R2|)+2|L1|+|R2|+2|L2|27
23
|R1|+ 1923 |L1|+ 2623 |R2|+ 1923 |L2|+ 723a|L2|
. As
|R1|+ |R2| − |L1| ≥ |L2| ≥ 0, this ratio increases with a and hence maximized at a = 1
5, which leads to the ratio: |R1|+|L1|+2|R2|+2|L2|27
23
|R1|+ 1923 |L1|+ 2623 |R2|+ 2623 |L2|
≤ 2313 .
(b) xi = 1 for all i ∈ R1. The ratio becomes a(−|R1|−|L1|+|R2|)+|R1|+2|L1|+|R2|+2|L2|20
23
|R1|+ 1923 |L1|+ 2623 |R2|+ 1923 |L2|+ 723a|L2|
. Maxi-
mization occurs either at a = 1 or at a = 0. We check both cases:
i. a = 1: the ratio becomes |L1|+2|R2|+2|L2|20
23
|R1|+ 1923 |L1|+ 2623 |R2|+ 2623 |L2|
≤ 2313 .
ii. a = 0: the ratio becomes |R1|+2|L1|+|R2|+2|L2|20
23
|R1|+ 1923 |L1|+ 2623 |R2|+ 1923 |L2|
. As |L| ≤ |R|, it follows that
the ratio is bounded from above by 1+220
23
+ 19
23
= 2313 .
2. a ∈ [1, 2]: in this case, the benefit from locating the facility at a is q1 =
∑
i∈R1(a − xi) +∑
i∈L1 |a − xi| +
∑
i∈R2(2 − |a − xi|) +
∑
i∈L2(2 + xi − a). Similarly to the analysis in the
previous case, we get that the ratio q1
q2
is maximized when xi = 0 for i ∈ R1, xi = 1 for
i ∈ L2, xi = a for i ∈ R2, and xi = 1 for all i ∈ L1 or xi = 2 for all i ∈ L1. We break into
cases:
(a) xi = 1 for all i ∈ L1: the ratio becomes a(|R1|−|L2|+|L1|)−|L1|+2|R2|+3|L2|1
23
a|R2|+ 2723 |R1|+ 2023 |L1|+ 2523 |R2|+ 2623 |L2|
. Maximum
is obtained at either a = 1 or a = 2:
5Of course, for agents i ∈ L2 we technically cannot have xi = 1, but the bound holds nonetheless.
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i. a = 1: the ratio becomes |R1|+2|R2|+2|L2|27
23
|R1|+ 2023 |L1|+ 2623 |R2|+ 2623 |L2|
≤ 2313 .
ii. a = 2: the ratio becomes 2|R1|+|L1|+2|R2|+|L2|27
23
|R1|+ 2023 |L1|+ 2723 |R2|+ 2623 |L2|
≤ 4627 < 2313 .
(b) xi = 2 for all i ∈ L1: the ratio becomes a(|R1|−|L2|−|L1|)+2|L1|+2|R2|+3|L2|1
23
a|R2|+ 2723 |R1|+ 1923 |L1|+ 2523 |R2|+ 2623 |L2|
. Maximum
is obtained at either a = 1 or a = 2:
i. a = 1: the ratio becomes |R1|+|L1|+2|R2|+2|L2|27
23
|R1|+ 1923 |L1|+ 2623 |R2|+ 2623 |L2|
≤ 2313 .
ii. a = 2: the ratio becomes 2|R1|+2|R2|+|L2|27
23
|R1|+ 1923 |L1|+ 2723 |R2|+ 2623 |L2|
≤ 4627 < 2313 .
The approximation ratio of the mechanism above is tight: when there are two agents of
different types, with the type 1 agent at 1 and the type 2 agent at 0, the optimal benefit is 3,
whereas the mechanism’s expected benefit is 3923 , and the ratio is exactly
23
13 .
4 Characterization of Deterministic Mechanisms for the Obnox-
ious Facility Model
We now focus on the special case where there are no type 2 agents, namely T = {1}, also
called the obnoxious facility model. The assumption that there are no type 2 agents will remain
in effect for the rest of this section. Note that in this case an agent’s report of its type is
meaningless, and so we drop it from the input of the mechanism. In this section, we characterize
all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for the obnoxious facility model. Similar results have
been independently obtained by others [8, 3, 10]. We begin with a temporary, somewhat weak
characterization of deterministic mechanisms, in terms of single agent deviations:
Theorem 3 (Reflection Theorem). For any deterministic mechanism f , agent i ∈ N , and partial
location profile x−i, define fx−i(a) = f(a,x−i)
6. Then, the mechanism f is strategyproof iff
each fx−i is of the following form: there exists (not necessarily distinct) αx−i , βx−i ∈ I, such that
βx−i ≥ αx−i and:
1. fx−i(a) = βx−i for 0 ≤ a <
αx−i+βx−i
2
2. fx−i(a) = αx−i for
αx−i+βx−i
2 < a ≤ 2
3. fx−i(
αx−i+βx−i
2 ) ∈ {αx−i , βx−i}
If αx−i 6= βx−i , we call
αx−i+βx−i
2 the reflection point of i for the partial profile x−i.
6Note that when i 6= j, x−i and x−j are distinct objects, regardless of the values of their coordinates.
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Proof. First, assume that f is of the form described above. On a partial location profile x−i,
agent i can only get the mechanism to choose one of (up to) two locations: αx−i or βx−i . Let
q =
αx−i+βx−i
2 . If xi = q, his distance from the two locations is equal, and so he is indifferent
between them. If xi ∈ [0, q), βx−i is weakly 7 farther from him than αx−i , and so he weakly
prefers βx−i , which is what the mechanism chooses, so he has no incentive to deviate. The case
of xi ∈ (q, 2] is similar. Thus, f is strategyproof.
On the other hand, assume that f is strategyproof. Fix a location profile x and an agent i.
Let g = fx−i and let β = g(0). Let S = {a ∈ I : g(a) 6= β}. If S is empty, then g is constant, and
we’re done. So assume S is nonempty. Consider m = inf S. Note that if β < m, then an agent
located at β can benefit from a deviation to any point in S. Thus, β ≥ m. Let α = 2m− β (note
that with our knowledge at this point, it might be the case that α is negative and hence not in
I; our proof is careful not to assume otherwise). We begin by claiming that either g(m) = α, or
that m is a limit point of the set K = {a ∈ I : g(a) = α}. There are two cases to consider:
1. m ∈ S. Note that in this case m > 0. We claim that in this case g(m) = α. Assume
otherwise, namely g(m) = α′ 6= α. Note also that α′ 6= β (since m ∈ S), and thus
m− α 6= |m− α′|. There are two subcases:
(a) m− α < |m− α′|. In that case, note that as long as the agent is to the left of m, the
facility is located at β. Thus, if the agent is located atm−ǫ for some ǫ > 0, his distance
from the facility is β−m+ ǫ. His distance from α′ is at least |m−α′| − ǫ. However, as
β−m = m−α < |m−α′|, we may choose ǫ small enough so that |m−α′|−ǫ > β−m+ǫ.
In this case, the agent’s deviation from m− ǫ to m is beneficial to that agent.
(b) m− α > |m− α′|. In this case, it is still true that as long as the agent is to the left of
m, the facility is located at β. As the distance of β −m = m−α > |m−α′|, it follows
that an agent located at m will benefit from deviating to the left.
So indeed, g(m) = α.
2. m /∈ S. Then m is a limit point of S (by definition). In this case we claim that m is a
limit point of K. Furthermore, note that β > m, since if β = m, then as m /∈ S, g(β) = β,
and the agent can benefit by deviating from β to any point in S. We note that since when
the agent is located at m, the facility is located at β, strategyproofness dictates that the
facility is always located in [α, β], no matter where the agent reports his location to be.
Now, assume m is not a limit point of K. Thus, it follows it must be a limit point of either
7Weakly because it is possible that αx
−i
= βx
−i
.
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K1 = {a ∈ I : α < g(a) ≤ m} or K2 = {a ∈ I : m ≤ g(a) < β} 8. So, there are two cases:
(a) m is a limit point of K1. In particular, there exists some ǫ > 0 such that m+ ǫ ∈ K1.
We consider the following subcases:
i. There exists 0 < ǫ′ < ǫ s.t. m+ ǫ′ ∈ K1 and g(m + ǫ′) < g(m + ǫ); in this case, a
deviation from m+ ǫ to m+ ǫ′ is beneficial.
ii. There exists 0 < ǫ′ < ǫ s.t. m+ ǫ′ ∈ K1 and g(m + ǫ′) > g(m + ǫ); in this case, a
deviation from m+ ǫ′ to m+ ǫ is beneficial.
iii. g(m + ǫ′) = g(m + ǫ) for all 0 < ǫ′ < ǫ s.t. m+ ǫ′ ∈ K1. As m is a limit point of
K1 and all points in K1 are to the right of m, it follows that we may choose ǫ
′ as
small as we want. For ǫ′ small enough, this would imply that the deviation from
m+ ǫ′ to m is beneficial: the distance of m+ ǫ′ from g(m+ ǫ) is m− g(m+ ǫ)+ ǫ′
and the distance of m+ ǫ′ from β is β−m− ǫ′. As β−m > m− g(m+ ǫ), we may
choose ǫ′ small enough to make the deviation in question beneficial.
(b) m is a limit point of K2. So, there exists 0 < ǫ <
β−m
2 such that m + ǫ ∈ K2. The
agent can benefit by deviating from m + ǫ to m (since the facility will be sent from
g(m+ ǫ) to β, and since m ≤ g(m+ ǫ) < β, g(m+ ǫ) is closer to m+ ǫ than β).
Hence, by strategyproofness, we have reached a contradiction, and so m must be a limit
point of K.
We have shown that if m ∈ S then g(m) = α, and otherwise by definition of S g(m) = β. To
complete the proof, we must show that g(a) = α for all a > m. Assume otherwise for some a′ > m.
First, note that since g(m) is either α or β, g(a) ∈ [α, β] for all a ∈ I by strategyproofness. Note
that within this range, α is the point farthest from a′. Thus, the agent has an incentive to deviate
from a′ to any point a′′ for which g(a′′) = α, where the existance of such a point is guaranteed by
the above discussion. This is a contradiction, and so we’ve completed our proof. 9
As a corollary of the above theorem, we can deduce:
Corollary 1. For any deterministic strategyproof mechanism f , and any n ∈ N, Rfn = {fn(x) :
x ∈ In} is finite.
Proof. Let x be an arbitrary profile, and set x0 = x. For a given profile xi−1, consider the profiles
z = (0,x−ii−1) and z′ = (2,x−ii−1). By the reflection theorem, at least one of f(z) = f(xi−1) or
8Note that since g(a) ∈ [α, β] for all a ∈ I , and m is a limit point of S, it follows that m is a limit point of
{a ∈ I : a ∈ [α, β)} = K ∪K1 ∪K2.
9Note that we didn’t actually need thatm is a limit point of K in the second case, but merely thatK is nonempty.
However, this doesn’t seem to lead to a much simpler proof, so we stick with the more general argument.
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f(z′) = f(xi−1) is true. This is trivial if agent i has no reflection point at xi−1−i . Otherwise, if he
has such a reflection point m, if xi−1i > m or x
i−1
i < m, he may deviate to 2 or 0 respectively
without changing the facility’s location; if xi−1i = m, then still the reflection theorem gives that
f(m,xi−1−i ) equals one of f(z) or f(z
′), as required 10. Set xi equal to a profile among z and z′
satisfying the equality. Thus, xn is a profile in which all agents are located at the endpoints and
f(xn) = f(x). Since x was arbitrary, we have that all elements of Rfn can be obtained by applying
the mechanism to profiles locating all agents at the endpoints. Since there are only finitely many
such profiles, Rfn is finite.
Now it is time for our strong characterization result. Consider the following definition:
Definition 2. Let f be a deterministic mechanism s.t. |Rfn| ≤ 2 for all n ∈ N. For each n ∈ N,
let Rfn = {αn, βn} s.t. βn ≥ αn 11, and let mn = αn+βn2 . For any n ∈ N, for every profile x ∈ In,
consider the partition of the agents Lx = {i ∈ N : xi < mn}, Mx = {i ∈ N : xi = mn}, and
Ex = {i ∈ N : xi > mn}. We say that f is a midpoint mechanism if it satisfies the following
property: for any n ∈ N, let x,y ∈ In be any profiles s.t. f(x) = βn and f(y) = αn. If βn > αn,
then there exists an agent i which satisfies one of the following:
(D-1) i ∈ Lx and i ∈My
(D-2) i ∈ Lx and i ∈ Ey
(D-3) i ∈Mx and i ∈ Ey
This definition is simple to interpret: the mechanism can switch the facility location from right
to left or from left to right only when an agent crosses the midpoint in the opposite direction.
In [9], the authors show that for a strategyproof mechanism f , |Rfn| ≤ 2 whenever Rfn is a
finite set12 13. Using that, we can now show:
Theorem 4. A deterministic mechanism f is strategyproof iff it is a midpoint mechanism.
Proof. First, consider a given midpoint mechanism f , and fix n ∈ N. If fn is constant, then clearly
it is strategyproof. Otherwise, |Rfn| = 2. Consider a profile x ∈ In and an agent i ∈ N . The
facility can only be located at αn or βn. If i ∈Mxn , he is indifferent between the two points, and
thus has no incentive to deviate. If i ∈ Exn , he prefers the facility to be located at αn; however, if
f(x) 6= αn, note that agent i cannot move the facility to αn by deviating- the rest of the agents
10f(z) if f(m,xi−1−i ) = βx−i , and f(z
′) if f(m,xi−1−i ) = αx−i .
11αn = βn is possible.
12While they assume anonymity, the proof of this fact does not rely on that assumption.
13Note that this is not an immediate implication of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, since the agents, by
reporting a location, cannot arbitrarily ”rank” the locations in Rfn; only some rankings are feasible.
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remain still, and he himself cannot be the agent required in the definition of the midpoint property
(that agent cannot be in Exn). The proof is similar for i ∈ Lxn.
Now, assume instead that f is a strategyproof mechanism. Fix n ∈ N. By corollary 4.2,
Rfn is finite, and thus by Ibara’s and Nagamochi’s result, |Rfn| ≤ 2. If Rfn is a singleton there
is nothing to prove; thus, assume |Rfn| = 2, and let αn, βn ∈ Rfn s.t. βn > αn. Let x,y ∈ In
s.t. f(x) = βn and f(y) = αn. Consider the sequence of profiles z
i, defined for i = 0, . . . , n via
zij = xj if j > i and z
i
j = yj otherwise. Assume no agent satisfies at least one of (D-1), (D-2)
and (D-3). Then, when agent i deviates in zi−1 to create profile zi, he does not cross mn from
left to right (i.e. moving from zi−1i < mn to z
i
i ≥ mn or zi−1i ≤ mn to zii > mn). As the possible
facility locations are αn and βn, mn is his only candidate for reflection point in z
i−1
−i . Thus, the
reflection theorem implies that he cannot change the facility location to αn by deviating. Hence,
f(y) = f(zn) = f(z0) = f(x), contradiction.
We note that Ibara and Nagmochi have characterized all anonymous mechanisms under the
assumption that Rfn is finite for all n ∈ N, using what they called “valid threshold mechanisms”.
Our proofs easily translate to the anonymous case, and under anonymity, our midpoint mecha-
nisms become equivalent to valid threshold mechanisms. Thus, our work allows the removal of
the finite Rfn assumption for the anonymous case as well.
5 Lower Bounds on Deterministic Mechanisms
We can use our characterization to obtain lower bounds on the possible approximation ratios for
the maxisum and egalitarian objectives in the deterministic setting. We note that negative results
obtained when T = {1} clearly hold when T = {1, 2}.
Theorem 5. No deterministic strategyproof mechanism f can provide an approximation ratio
better than 3 for the maxisum objective, even when T = {1}.
Proof. Let f be a deterministic strategyproof mechanism. Assume T = {1}. Let n ∈ N be even.
If fn is constant, the approximation ratio is clearly unbounded. If R
f
n is not a singleton, then by
Theorem 4.4, |Rfn| = 2. Consider the profile x ∈ In which locates agents 1 through n2 at αn, agents
n
2 + 1 through n at βn (where αn < βn are as in the definition of midpoint mechanism). Assume
without loss of generality that f(x) 6= αn. Consider the profile y which locates agents 1 through
n
2 at mn− ǫ for some ǫ > 0, and agrees with x on the rest of the agents. Since no deviating agent
reaches mn, the facility location doesn’t change, that is f(y) = f(x) = βn. Locating the facility
at βn (on profile y) leads to a benefit of
n
2 · (βn−αn2 + ǫ), while locating the facility at αn leads to
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a benefit of n2 · (βn−αn2 − ǫ) + n2 (βn − αn), and sending ǫ→ 0 gives us the required result. 14
By Theorem 3.1, our lower bound is best-possible. Our characterization can also be used to
get a lower bound for the egalitarian objective:
Theorem 6. No deterministic strategyproof mechanism f can provide a bounded approximation
ratio for the egalitarian objective, even when T = {1}.
Proof. Assume T = {1}. For any n ≥ 2, |Rfn| ≤ 2 by Theorem 4.4. Consider any profile which
locates at least one agent at each point in Rfn; any such profile leads to a social benefit of 0 for
the mechanism, whereas the optimal benefit is positive.
6 Lower Bounds on Randomized Mechanisms
We begin with the maxisum objective. We provide a lower bound of 2√
3
on the approximation
ratio of randomized strategyproof mechanisms.
Theorem 7. No randomized strategyproof mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better
than 2√
3
for the maxisum objective, even when T = {1}.
Proof. Let f be a randomized strategyproof mechanism which provides an approximation ratio
c < 2√
3
for the maxisum objective. Consider the case where N = {1, 2} and T = {1}, and let
a = 2
√
3− 3. Let x be the location profile in which x1 = 1− a and x2 = 1 + a. Assume without
loss of generality that P (f(x) < x1) ≥ P (f(x) > x2). The expected distance of the facility from
x1 on this profile is at most (1−a)P (f(x) < x1)+(1+a)P (f(x) > x2)+2aP (x1 ≤ f(x) ≤ x2); as
P (f(x) < x1) ≥ P (f(x) > x2) and 2a ≤ 1, this implies that the expected distance of the facility
from x1 on profile x is at most 1.
Let y be the profile in which y1 = 0 and y2 = 1 + a. Let b = E[f(y)|f(y) > y2] − y2, and
let p = P (f(x) > y2). The mechanism’s expected benefit is 1 + a + 2bp, while the optimal cost
is 3 − a. To maintain approximation ratio of c, we must have 1 + a + 2bp ≥ 3−a
c
, which implies
bp ≥ 3−a2c − 1+a2 . Also, as b ≤ 1−a, we have that p ≥ 11−a(3−a2c − 1+a2 ). Now, the expected distance
of the facility from x1 on y is (2a + b)p ≥ ( 2a1−a + 1)(3−a2c − 1+a2 ) > ( 2a1−a + 1)(
√
33−a4 − 1+a2 ) = 1.
This violates strategyproofness, as agent 1 has an incentive to misreport his location to be 0 when
the location profile is x.
Next, we show a lower bound of 32 for the egalitarian objective:
14If n is odd, we could still make this proof work by locating the additional agent at mn and send n→∞.
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Theorem 8. No randomized strategyproof mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better
than 32 for the egalitarian objective, even when T = {1}.
Proof. Assume T = {1}. Let f be such a mechanism, with approximation ratio c < 32 . Let the
endpoints be 0 andM+2, whereM is some large number. Consider the case with n = 2⌈M+1
ǫ
⌉+4
agents, where 1 > ǫ > 0. Consider the profile x which locates one agent at 1 and M + 1, locates
an agent in each 1+aǫ ∈ (1,M +1) s.t. a ∈ N, and splits the rest of the agents evenly among the
two endpoints (if there is an odd number of agents remaining, locate one agent at M+22 ). Note
that an optimal facility location is at M + 112 , with a benefit of
1
2 . Let p be the probability that
the facility is located at [1,M +1]. It follows that the resulting expected benefit is upper bounded
by ǫ2p +
1
2(1 − p). To get the required approximation ratio, we must have ǫ2p + 12(1 − p) ≥ 12c ,
which gives p ≤
1
2
(1− 1
c
)
1
2
− ǫ
2
. The facility must be located either in [0, 1] or in [M + 1,M + 2] with
probability at least 1−p2 . Assume without loss of generality that it is located with probability at
least 1−p2 in [0, 1]. Consider the profile x
′, which is obtained from profile x by relocating the agents
from 0 so that there is an agent in every point aǫ ∈ [0, 1) s.t. a ∈ N. Let p′ be the probability
that on this profile, the facility is located at [0,M + 1]. Note that the optimal facility location
remains M + 112 with benefit
1
2 , and on the other hand the expected benefit on this profile is
bounded by ǫ2p
′+ 12(1− p′), yielding the bound p′ ≤
1
2
(1− 1
c
)
1
2
− ǫ
2
. Let us analyze the expected distance
of the facility from 0 in the two profiles. For x, the expected distance from 0 is no more than
1−p
2 + p(M + 1) +
1−p
2 (M + 2). On the other hand, for x
′, the expected distance from 0 is no
less than (1 − p′)(M + 1). Since we have obtained x′ from x using deviations of agents from 0,
strategyproofness dictates 1−p2 + p(M + 1) +
1−p
2 (M + 2) ≥ (1 − p′)(M + 1) 15. Reorganizing
this, we get: 3−p2 +
1+p
2 M ≥ (1 − p′)M + 1 − p′. Using our bounds for p and p′, this implies the
inequality 12 + (
1
2 +
1
2
(1− 1
c
)
1−ǫ )M ≥ (1 −
1
2
(1− 1
c
)
1
2
− ǫ
2
)M −
1
2
(1− 1
c
)
1
2
− ǫ
2
. Let us reorganize this inequality to
1
2 +
1
2
(1− 1
c
)
1
2
− ǫ
2
≥ (12 −
3
2
(1− 1
c
)
1−ǫ )M . As c <
3
2 , we can choose ǫ > 0 small enough so that
1
2 −
3
2
(1− 1
c
)
1−ǫ > 0.
Sending M to ∞ then causes the r.h.s of the inequality to go to ∞, violating the inequality.
7 Mutiple Locations Per Agent in the Obnoxious Model
In this section we follow the spirit of a suggestion in [12] and study a generalized model, in
which a single agent may be associated with more than one location. As this multiple location
15Consider the sequence of profiles x0 through xn, such that profile xi agrees with x′ on the location of agents 1
through i and with x on the location of the rest of the agents. Let i∗ be the index that maximizes EY∼f(xi)[Y ]; if
there is more than one such index, choose the minimal one. If i∗ > 0, then it is beneficial for agent i∗ to deviate so
that the profile changes from xi
∗−1 to xi
∗
, violating strategyproofness. Thus i∗ = 0, implying the expected distance
of the facility from 0 in those profiles satisfies EY∼f(x0)[Y ] ≥ EY∼f(xn)[Y ]. But, since x
0 = x and xn = x′, we
know that 1−p
2
+ p(M + 1) + 1−p
2
(M + 2) ≥ EY∼f(x)[Y ] and EY∼f(x′)[Y ] ≥ (1− p
′)(M + 1).
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model is a generalization of our previous model, the lower bounds carry over; in particular, for
the maxisum objective, we have lower bounds of 3 and 2√
3
on deterministic and randomized
mechanisms respectively, even when T = {1}. We show that when T = {1}, in the deterministic
case, we can find a strategyproof mechanism to match the lower bound, despite the additional
power given to the agents. In addition, still when T = {1}, we provide a family of 32 - approximate
randomized strategyproof mechanisms.
Our generalized model (for the definition of the model, we do not assume T = {1}) can be
obtained from our previous model via the following changes. First, let k = (k1, . . . , kn) ∈ Nn. A
location profile is now z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn), where for each i = 1, ..., n, zi = (zi1, z
i
2, . . . , z
i
ki
) ∈ Iki .
A deterministic mechanism is a collection of functions f = {fkn : n ∈ N,k ∈ Nn}, such that
fkn : T
n × Ik1 × . . . × Ikn → I is a function that maps each pair of type and location profiles to
a facility location. The benefit of agent i from facility location y is now defined as B(θi, z
i, y) =
∑ki
j=1B(θi, z
i
j , y), where B(θi, x, y) is |x − y| when θi = 1 and 2 − |x − y| when θi = 2. The
maxisum objective is
∑n
i=1B(θi, z
i, y) as usual. The rest of the notation carries over, and the
adjustment to the randomized model is easy and left to the reader. For the approximation ratio,
we note that the possible instances of the problem include all possible options for both n and k.
First, we provide a 3- approximate strategyproof deterministic mechanism for the case where
T = {1}.
Theorem 9. Let R∗ = {i :
∑ki
j=1 zj
ki
≤ 1}, L∗ = {i :
∑ki
j=1 zj
ki
> 1}. Let f be the mechanism
which locates the facility at 2 if
∑
i∈R∗ ki ≥
∑
i∈L∗ ki and at 0 otherwise. This mechanism is
strategyproof and 3- approximate for the maxisum objective when T = {1}.
Proof. Strategyproofness is easy (note that R∗ is exactly the set of agents weakly preferring the
facility to be located at 2 over 0). The optimal facility location is clearly in {0, 2}. Assume
without loss of generality that f(z) = 2. All we have to prove is that sb(z,0)
sb(z,2) ≤ 3. But note that
every agent i ∈ R∗ receives a benefit of at least ki when the facility is located at 2 and at most
ki when the facility is located at 0. On the other hand, each agent i ∈ L∗ trivially gets a benefit
between 0 and 2ki. Thus, using the fact that f(z) = 2 implies
∑
i∈R∗ ki ≥
∑
i∈L∗ ki, we get
sb(z,0)
sb(z,2) ≤
2
∑
i∈L∗ ki+
∑
i∈R∗ ki∑
i∈R∗ ki
≤ 2
∑
i∈R∗ ki+
∑
i∈R∗ ki∑
i∈R∗ ki
= 3.
Note that when ki = 1 for all i, this mechanism reduces to the mechanism proposed in [5].
Finally, we define a class of randomized strategyproof mechanisms that provide a 32 - approxi-
mation ratio when T = {1} and show that it is nonempty.
Theorem 10. Let f be a randomized mechanism that, for a profile z, locates the facility at 0 with
probability pz and at 2 with probability (1 − pz). Then, when T = {1}, the following conditions
on pz are sufficient to make the mechanism strategyproof and
3
2 - approximate:
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1. pz is increasing in
∑
i∈L∗ ki and decreasing in
∑
i∈R∗ ki.
2. 13 +
1
6 ·
∑
i∈L∗ ki∑
i∈R∗ ki
≥ pz ≥ 23 − 16 ·
∑
i∈R∗ ki∑
i∈L∗ ki
(if
∑
i∈R∗ ki = 0, the leftmost term is ∞; if∑
i∈L∗ ki = 0, the rightmost term is −∞).
Furthermore, the class of mechanisms of this form is nonempty.
Proof. Strategyproofness is clear. Fix z, and set p = pz. For the approximation ratio, there
are two cases to consider. First, assume that the optimal facility location for profile z is 0,
with social benefit OPT . If 0 and 2 are both optimal, clearly any choice of p yields approx-
imation ratio 1. Assume 2 is not optimal; then
∑
i∈L∗ ki > 0. As for every i ∈ R∗ we have
that
∑ki
j=1 zj
ki
≤ 1, his benefit from locating the facility at 2 is at least ki, and so the social
benefit from locating the facility there is at least
∑
i∈R∗ ki. Thus, it is enough to prove that
pOPT + (1 − p)∑i∈R∗ ki ≥ 23OPT , or equivalently (1− p)
∑
i∈R∗ ki ≥ (23 − p)OPT . If the right
hand side is negative, then this inequality is satisfied. Assume that the right hand side is nonneg-
ative. Note that OPT ≤ 2∑i∈L∗ ki+
∑
i∈R∗ ki (the benefit of i ∈ R∗ from locating the facility at
0 is bounded by ki, while the benefit of i ∈ L∗ is trivially bounded by 2ki). Thus, it is enough to
prove that (1− p)∑i∈R∗ ki ≥ (23 − p)(2
∑
i∈L∗ ki +
∑
i∈R∗ ki). Isolating p in this inequality gives
p ≥ 23 − 16
∑
i∈R∗ ki∑
i∈L∗ ki
, which is satisfied.
On the other hand, assume that the optimal facility location for profile z is 2; note that this
implies
∑
i∈R∗ ki > 0. Similarly to the analysis above, we can get a lower bound of
∑
i∈L∗ ki on
the benefit of locating the facility at 0 and upper bound of 2
∑
i∈R∗ ki +
∑
i∈L∗ ki on OPT .
Thus, we need that (1 − p)OPT + p∑i∈L∗ ki ≥ 23OPT , and so it is enough to verify that
p
∑
i∈L∗ ki ≥ (p− 13)(2
∑
i∈R∗ ki +
∑
i∈L∗ ki). Isolating p yields p ≤ 13 + 16
∑
i∈L∗ ki∑
i∈R∗ ki
.
Finally, we verify that p = max {23 − 16 ·
∑
i∈R∗ ki∑
i∈L∗ ki
, 0} (where if ∑i∈L∗ ki = 0, p = 0) satisfies the
above properties. The only thing that requires proof is p ≤ 13+ 16 ·
∑
i∈L∗ ki∑
i∈R∗ ki
(assuming
∑
i∈R∗ ki > 0;
if
∑
i∈R∗ ki = 0 then there is nothing to prove). Note that the right hand side is positive, so it is
enough to show is that 13+
1
6 ·
∑
i∈L∗ ki∑
i∈R∗ ki
≥ 23− 16 ·
∑
i∈R∗ ki∑
i∈L∗ ki
when
∑
i∈L∗ ki > 0. But this is equivalent to
(
∑
i∈L∗ ki)
2+(
∑
i∈R∗ ki)
2
(
∑
i∈L∗ ki)(
∑
i∈R∗ ki)
≥ 2, and note that (
∑
i∈L∗ ki)
2+(
∑
i∈R∗ ki)
2
(
∑
i∈L∗ ki)(
∑
i∈R∗ ki)
= 2+
(
∑
i∈L∗ ki−
∑
i∈R∗ ki)
2
(
∑
i∈L∗ ki)(
∑
i∈R∗ ki)
≥ 2.
It is worth noting that the randomized mechanism given in [5], for the special case of ki = 1
for all i, falls into the category of mechanisms we defined here.
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8 Future Research
There are many additional possible directions for this research. The immediate question stemming
from our results is what further improvement can be achieved in the approximation ratio under
the hybrid model by using randomization. Another interesting question is whether it is possible to
derive a clear characterization of randomized strategyproof mechanisms. Other directions include
characterization and bounds for topologies different than the interval, and for objectives other
than maxisum and egalitarian.
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